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A Tale of Three Markets Revisited
Kathleen C. Engel* and Patricia A. McCoy**
I. Introduction
Susan Wachter's and Elizabeth Renuart's comments highlight two
phenomena that are critical to understanding predatory lending: the paucity
of legitimate risk-based pricing in the subprime market and the steering of
people of color to predatory loans. We agree completely with Dr. Wachter's
assessment that information asymmetries have impeded the evolution of a
well-functioning home mortgage market.' Without closure of these
information gaps or regulations that compensate for the information gaps,
predatory lenders will continue to capture excess rents. We likewise endorse
Ms. Renuart's timely and astute observation that predatory lending, among
other things, must be understood as a story of race and place.2 White
customers tend to secure prime loans with favorable rates. In contrast,
lenders often steer black and Hispanic customers in poorer neighborhoods to
costly subprime loans, regardless of their credit ratings.3 Without question,
racial targeting is a marker of predatory lending and is deeply troubling.
While we agree with these and many other assessments the commentators
make, we do part company in certain places. In this brief reply, we address
the areas in which we disagree with Ms. Renuart and Dr. Wachter and
respond to other issues they raised in their comments.
Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
I. See Susan M. Wachter, Price Revelation and Efficient Mortgage Markets, 82 TEXAS L. REV.
413, 415 (2003).
2. See Elizabeth A. Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Market: Suggested Reforms in
A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 421, 425-26 (2003).
3. See DEP'TS OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & TREASURY TASK FORCE, CURBING PREDATORY
MORTGAGE LENDING 22, 93 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications
/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT] (citing evidence that people of color are
more likely than whites with comparable incomes to receive subprime loans), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf; ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL, THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT 28-29 (2000)
(noting that recent research using testers has revealed ongoing racial discrimination by lenders);
Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency 8 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (finding that subprime borrowers
tend to live in low-income neighborhoods with disproportionately high concentrations of people of
color).
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II. Discussion
A. The Suitability Standard and Rules
In her comments, Dr. Wachter expresses concern that our suitability
proposal, in the absence of rulemaking, will create an incentive for lenders to
be overly cautious and adopt unnecessarily stringent rules.4 Alternatively,
she posits that without sufficient understanding of markets and the impact of
predatory lending sanctions, it may be premature to render explicit suitability
rules. 5 We agree that bright-line rules are essential to an effective suitability
standard. For that reason, we recommend that any suitability legislation pro-
vide that borrowers can only bring claims for violations of rules promulgated
by the agency vested with implementing authority. Furthermore, we strongly
urge that the agency adopt bright-line rules whenever possible. In other
words, we do not suggest that suitability provide a cause of action in the ab-
sence of a rule violation. Such a course would inevitably lead to inconsistent
judicial interpretation.
Several years ago, we would have echoed Dr. Wachter's alternative
concern: "Do we know enough today to determine optimal national
regulation in this area? ' 6 We contend that there is sufficient evidence today
to begin crafting suitability rules. For starters, there are several practices that
policymakers and responsible lenders agree are predatory per se (e.g.,
lending without regard to ability to pay, the use of yield-spread premiums,
and the packaging of single-premium credit life insurance with subprime
mortgages). These practices could thus be subject to rulemaking without
further investigation.7
In evaluating the utility of other potential suitability rules, we can look
to a number of sources. The Mortgage Bankers Association of America, for
example, has promulgated model guidelines that can provide direction.8 We
can also draw on federal, state, and municipal initiatives to address lending
abuses. For instance, there is a growing body of experience under the Home
4. Wachter, supra note 1, at 414-15.
5. Id. at 415. Dr. Wachter also worries that a national standard would undermine stricter state
and local regulations. Id. at 416. Our position is that any national standard should set a floor,
giving states the option of enacting more stringent laws.
6. Id. at 415.
7. We agree with Ms. Renuart's suggestion that any suitability rules should include limits on
the financing of points and fees. See Renuart, supra note 2, at 434. In the Appendix to our original
article, we list loan terms and practices that we contend should be deemed unsuitable per se as well
as other terms and practices that, depending on the circumstances, may be unsuitable. Kathleen C.
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory
Lending, 80 TEXAs L. REv. 1255, 1367-81 (2002).
8. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., Best Practices/Legislative Guidelines: Subprime Lending,
at http://www.mbaa.org/resident/lib2000/0525b.html (last visited Nov.21, 2003).
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Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). 9 Similarly, states that have
enacted predatory lending laws, like North Carolina, serve as laboratories for
testing the impact of predatory lending provisions on the home mortgage
market.' 0 Although the results are not in from every jurisdiction, the evi-
dence from North Carolina suggests that the North Carolina law has deterred
some of the worst lending abuses without unduly hampering the legitimate
home mortgage market." This evidence together with empirical and
theoretical understandings of the market, is now sufficient to inform an initial
set of suitability rules.
Just the same, it is premature to promulgate a fixed and complete set of
suitability rules. Rather, the designated agency should begin by crafting
rules based on the current state of knowledge, and amend the rules and adopt
new rules as additional information becomes available from the state
"laboratories." There is an additional benefit to piecemeal rulemaking.
Predatory lenders will inevitably develop new practices that fall outside the
suitability rules. As Ms. Renuart highlighted, since the publication of our
original article, a new abuse has emerged, consisting of predatory servicing
by agents-a practice that falls outside the purview of most, if not all,
predatory lending laws.' 2 Any statutory suitability standard must vest full
discretion in the implementing agency to designate new practices as
unsuitable as predatory lenders and their agents perpetrate new abuses not
covered by existing rules.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization
Ms. Renuart expresses skepticism about our proposed self-regulatory
organization (SRO) model. 13 Her words are well taken. Almost two years
have passed since we wrote our initial article. During that time, instead of
mounting a credible attempt at voluntary self-regulation, the subprime in-
dustry has devoted enormous sums of time and money to a vociferous
campaign aimed at defeating predatory lending legislation and rules in every
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa), 1639 (2000); see, e.g., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at
5-10 (detailing recommendations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the
Department of Treasury for amendments to improve HOEPA).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-.iE, 24-10.2 (2000).
11. See Keith D. Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage
Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law 2, 16-17 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (noting that evidence of a drop in lending by
subprime non-bank lenders in North Carolina may indicate that the law is curbing abusive lending);
Roberto G. Quercia, et al., The Impact of North Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Law: A
Descriptive Assessment 21-22 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law
Review), available al http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/cc ncanti_ predatory_
law_impact.pdf (finding that the North Carolina Anti-Predatory Lending Law reduced the number
of loans with predatory terms without inhibiting borrowers with blemished credit from obtaining
loans).
12. See Renuart, supra note 2, at 426-27.
13. Id. at 433-34.
2003]
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conceivable venue, including legislatures, agencies, and courts. 14 Until the
subprime industry lays down its arms and establishes tough, binding self-
regulation, an SRO proposal would be premature.
C. Risk-Based Pricing
We have a substantive difference with Ms. Renuart's comments
regarding risk-based pricing. She suggests that when borrowers have
sufficient loan-to-value ratios, they should not pay a risk premium if they
have less than prime-rate credit scores. 15 There is no escaping the fact that
on average, default and foreclosure rates rise as credit scores go down.'
6
Lenders who make loans to borrowers with blemished credit face added
servicing costs and foreclosure costs, which they may not be able to recoup if
the property has depreciated since origination. Thus, lenders and investors
will not lend to credit-impaired borrowers unless they can collect a premium
commensurate with their added risk. In one sense, as Ms. Renuart points out,
this presents a cruel paradox because risk premiums make it even harder for
borrowers with bad credit to repay their loans.17 Nevertheless, the fact re-
mains that in this market economy, capital suppliers will not come to the
table unless they can charge a premium that is proportional to risk.
Risk-based pricing, however, is not a license to charge supranormal
rates. Risk-based pricing means pricing that is commensurate with risk, not
carte blanche. Nevertheless, under the battle cry of "risk-based pricing," the
14. See Diana B. Henriques & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Bankers Opposing New State Curbs on
Unfair Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at Cl; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick McGeehan,
Lenders Try to Fend Off Laws on Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at CI (both
discussing the lending industry's lobbying efforts to block enactment and enforcement of state
predatory lending laws).
15. Renuart, supra note 2, at 427. We are concerned that this argument could foster a different
danger by inadvertently giving support to asset-based lending, something that both we and Ms.
Renuart assiduously oppose in residential mortgage lending. As for defaults that borrowers cure
before any danger of foreclosure, Ms. Renuart asserts that monthly late fees on the order of five
percent of the payment due are sufficient to compensate servicers for collection expenses and loss of
the use of principal. Id. at 427-28. However, a $50 late fee on a $1,000 overdue payment may not
fully defray the office space and staff overhead costs of collecting that payment, in which case the
cost of collection would likely have to be captured elsewhere in the interest, fees, and points.
Finally, in response to Ms. Renuart's comments on prepayment penalties in the subprime
market, we thoroughly agree that the industry has not demonstrated the need for prepayment
penalties and certainly not for ones of the magnitude commonly charged. Prepayment risk and
prepayment penalties are highly complex topics that we plan to address in our future work. In the
meantime, we reiterate our support for a moratorium on prepayment penalties until such time as the
subprime market becomes competitive. For a detailed explanation of this view, see Engel &
McCoy, supra note 7, at 1377-79.
16. JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES
FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 76 (1997) (demonstrating that "the lower the credit
grade, the higher the delinquency rate"); Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime and Prime
Mortgages: Loss Distributions 7 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law
Review) (noting that borrowers with lower credit scores are more likely to default).
17. See Renuart, supra note 2, at 427.
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subprime industry has distorted and misused that concept to charge interest,
points, and fees far in excess of the risks that individual borrowers present.18
This is undeniably true for the large proportion of subprime borrowers who
in fact would qualify for prime mortgages. 19 Indeed, the high prevalence of
steering in the subprime market shows an ability to price-discriminate that is
indicative of an anticompetitive market structure.2 °
Likewise, subprime borrowers with blemished credit histories are the
victims of industry rent-seeking. A Freddie Mac study of A-minus subprime
mortgages concluded, for instance, that "roughly one-half of the interest rate
premium paid by subprime borrowers-100 basis points--cannot easily be
explained by the higher levels of risk associated with these types of loans.'
Additionally, the subprime mortgage market displays numerous features of
an industry lacking competition over price. One striking indicator is the
marked discontinuity between the prime rate and the best subprime rates.22
In a true risk-based pricing system, prices would either be graduated or dis-
play far smaller discontinuities between prime and subprime loans. The
secrecy of subprime rate sheets and the complex, multipart pricing structure
of subprime loans with their bewildering array of nominal interest rates,
points, fees, and prepayment penalties are further evidence of price
discrimination. 23 Finally, yield-spread premiums artificially boost subprime
interest rates above what competitive lenders would be willing to accept.24
In a truly competitive market, risk premiums would not exceed the risks
presented. The fact that they do-and by a substantial margin-is a
18. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 7, at 1265-67.
19. For two discussions of steering studies, see id at 1264 n.20, 1279 n.105, and Alan M.
White, Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing-Present and Future Research 17-18 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review).
20. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135 (1988)
(explaining that "the producer may observe some signal that is related to the consumer's preferences
(e.g., age, occupation, location) and use this signal to price-discriminate; this is termed third-degree
price discrimination"). In the subprime context, such signals consist of race, ethnicity, gender, age,
location, and credit constraints.
21. Lax et al., supra note 3, at 18.
22. See id. at 17-19; Terri Cullen, How to Help Your Credit Before Applying for a Loan, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, July 3, 2003 (listing pricing discontinuities reported by Myfico.com); White, supra
note 19, at 10-11.
23. See White, supra note 19, at 8-9, 11-13.
24. See, e.g., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 3, at 40 (describing yield-spread
premiums); Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (2002) (statement of Prof Howell E. Jackson) (concluding that yield spread premiums "serve only
to [benefit] mortgage brokers," not consumers, and levy "implicit interest rates [that] are absolutely
outrageous"), available at http://banking.senate.gov/0201hrg/010802/jackson.htm; Howell E.
Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson
/pdfs/januarydraft.pdf); Susan E. Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market 2, 7-8,
33 (July 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (reviewing the
role of yield-spread premiums in broker compensation and concluding that subprime borrowers are
more likely than prime borrowers to select pricing options that allow brokers to extract rents).
2003]
Texas Law Review
compelling sign of competitive distortions in the subprime market. What the
pricing structure of subprime loans exemplifies is rent-seeking, not risk-
based pricing.
D. Assignee Liability
Ms. Renuart and Dr. Wachter urge us to expand and refine our approach
to assignee liability.25 In the past two years, assignee liability has moved to
the forefront of the debate over predatory lending. In our original article, we
focused on the origination market, and any policy conclusions we reached on
assignee liability were strictly preliminary. Our current research is
specifically devoted to assignee liability.
III. Conclusion
As the comments on our Tale of Three Markets article reflect, predatory
lending has sparked a robust debate. We believe that this debate will
generate an informed and effective policy response, and we are grateful to
the editors of the Texas Law Review for moving the discussion forward by
inviting the very important comments by Ms. Renuart and Dr. Wachter.
25. Renuart, supra note 2, at 437-38; Wachter, supra note 1, at 416-17. Dr. Wachter suggests
that assignee liability for extant causes of action would eliminate the need for a suitability standard.
Id. at 417. We disagree with this suggestion. As we discussed at length in our original article, the
existing claims that borrowers can pursue when alleging predatory lending against originators and
brokers involve numerous and often insurmountable hurdles. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 7, at
1299-1309, 1314-17; Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 557 (2002) (discussing assignees'
ability to raise holder-in-due-course status as a defense to predatory lending claims). These hurdles
would be even higher in suits alleging extant claims against secondary market purchasers.
[Vol. 82:439
